


Reserve officers' training, San Francisco, 1944.



U.S. Army

# Transforming Reserve Forces

By ALBERT C. ZAPANTA

**T**he Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) is the principal policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense on all matters relating to the Reserve components and provides independent and timely advice and recommendations on the challenges they face. The Secretary has asked the board to support transformation, rebalance and strengthen the Reserve components, and assist the Reserve in reconnecting with America.

The board meets quarterly and reports annually to Congress. It consists of 24 members including the Chairman, the Assistant Secretaries for Manpower and Reserve Affairs of each military department, and flag and general officers from active and Reserve forces and the Coast Guard. The regular officers are designated by their respective service Secretaries, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff names the military executive, and the Secretary of Defense designates the Reserve officers. Congress has repeatedly stated its

**The Honorable Albert C. Zapanta is Chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board.**

desire that the board act independently in its advisory and reporting roles—a position steadfastly maintained and more important than ever due to increased reliance on Reserve forces and mobilizations in support of the war on terrorism.

## Mobilization

Total Force policies, the Abrams Doctrine, downsizing, and increasing peacetime missions and contingencies have led to greater reliance on Reserve forces. Some 319,000 of the 1.2 million Reserve component personnel (27 percent) were called to active duty from September 11, 2001, through the end of 2003. Reservists supported operations centers and flight operations and provided security at the Pentagon, Ground Zero, airports, seaports, and military installations nationwide. They fought on the front lines in Afghanistan and Iraq and tracked terrorists throughout Africa and Asia. They are maintaining the peace in Afghanistan, the Balkans, Iraq, and the Sinai and have participated in a wide range of domestic missions. There is no indication that reliance on the Reserve components will lessen in the foreseeable future.

How effectively the Department of Defense (DOD) and the services have mobilized and pursued organizational and process improvements has been studied since 9/11. Reserve component forces were traditionally mobilized based on deliberate operational plans. The services used predictable operating cycles and advance notification to prepare for mobilizations. When existing operation plans were not sufficient, mobilizations were guided by a modified process that relied on additional management oversight and multiple layers of coordination. The current threat environment, however, creates a need to move toward a capabilities-based approach.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided guidance to U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) about developing a more agile, responsive process for mobilizing Reserve forces and individuals. The plan requires changes in service and joint doctrine,

policy, and law. JFCOM assembled subject matter experts from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)/Reserve Forces Policy Board, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve

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Affairs (OASD/RA), the Joint Staff, command centers, the services, and the seven Reserve components to seek mobilization process reform. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in coordination with JFCOM, the Joint Staff, the services, OASD/RA, and other OSD staff formed a working group to identify “quick win” opportunities to improve policy and process changes that could boost mobilization efficiency. The board participated in both efforts and has developed a long-term relationship with JFCOM to help with mobilization process reform and related issues. The board developed a white paper on mobilization reform, a summary of significant issues, recommendations, and actions toward mobilization reform in October 2003, which consisted of information from published reports, board visits to unified commanders, lessons learned, and conferences.

The mobilization process typically begins with identifying requirements, which are consolidated and forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as requests for forces. The services review approved requirements and coordinate with force providers and Reserve component headquarters to verify individual and unit readiness. Finally, the services issue activation orders to units and individuals. This normally takes several weeks. Most Reservists complete the activation process within 24 to 96 hours, though some require lengthy post-activation/mobilization training that delays movement into theater. Medical, dental, family, or employer problems can appear any time, requiring a replacement and further delaying the process. Factors that impact efficiency include identifying valid mobilization

requirements, negotiating the approval process, identifying and validating the appropriate fill, certifying individual readiness, notifying individuals in a timely manner, timely processing of mobilization (activation) orders, completing the activation process (which includes medical and dental certification, benefits/legal and mission-related briefings, security clearance certification or processing, uniform and personal protective equipment issuance, and establishing active duty pay accounts), and validating mission-specific training, equipment processing, etc.

## Judicious and Prudent Use

To ease pressure on Reserve resources, commanders should request capabilities in detail without specifying which service will provide them. All services with forces available should be used without a bias toward the service that has traditionally met the request. Joint Reserve sourcing solutions should meet all requirements external to the services while supporting internal service requirements for providing additional activated forces.

Judicious and prudent use of the Reserve components to reach a high level of efficiency and effectiveness in the mobilization process will require changes in policy, law, and doctrine. The magnitude and duration of the war on terrorism make the Reserve role essential. The following precepts have been proposed by the Reserve Board before sourcing a required capability to a Reserve unit or individual:

- Activate Reserve component forces, when possible with the consent of the individuals being called to full-time duty.
- Employ units and individuals in a manner that maximizes utilization of core capabilities throughout the validated requirement or the length of the original orders to active duty, whichever is shorter.
- Give early consideration to the feasibility of using alternate manpower sources such as active duty forces, coalition forces, host nation support, civilian contracted labor, or technological solutions.
- Apply innovative management alternatives such as retiree volunteers, civilian volunteers, and auxiliary members.
- Provide predictability to Reservists, families, and employers when sourcing requirements.

## The Reserve Components Operating Environment

**Total Force Policy:** In 1973, as a result of declining defense budgets and the U.S. experience in Vietnam, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger enacted The Total Force Policy, which states that Active, Guard, and Reserve forces will share in world-wide missions, resource allocations, and force structure. All will be equipped and trained to the same standards. Today, the Total Force is comprised of the Active and Reserve components, Department of Defense civilians, and the civilian contractor workforce.

**Abrams Doctrine:** After the Vietnam War, then Chief of Staff of the Army General Creighton Abrams vowed that the Army would never again go to war without engaging the support of the American public. He stressed the importance of the citizen soldier as the link between a viable national security policy and the will of the people. In his "roundout" concept, Abrams advocated a force structure that links the Reserve component with Active forces so that significant future deployments will have to involve Reserve forces, thereby ensuring and protecting the vital link to the American people.

**Transformation:** World events since the Cold War underscore the ever-changing face of America's adversaries. The Department of Defense is undergoing a transformation in strategies, force structure, and capabilities designed to keep the Nation a step ahead of the threats emerging during the first 25 years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. By its very nature, transformation will provide evolutionary, nontraditional approaches to winning the war on terror.

### History of the Reserve Forces Policy Board

The Reserve Forces Policy Board was established in 1952, just five years after the Department of Defense itself was set up in 1947. That same year President Harry Truman ordered the Secretary of Defense to strengthen all elements of the Reserve components. In response, James Forrestal appointed the Committee on Civilian Components to make a comprehensive, objective, and impartial study of the Reserve components of the Armed Forces. The committee recommended that the Secretary of Defense create a standing committee to recommend policies and procedures affecting the Guard and Reserve. The Secretary of Defense adopted the committee's recommendation, and on June 14, 1949, created a Civilian Components Policy Board.

In 1951, Secretary of Defense George G. Marshall changed the name of the organization to the Reserve Forces Policy Board to more accurately reflect the Board's focus. The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 then codified the Reserve Forces Policy Board in the Department of Defense.

Although the board had existed via regulations for a number of years, Congress envisioned a somewhat different purpose for it. As outlined in Title 10, U.S. Code, Congress chartered the board to act as the principal policy

advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Congress on all National Guard and Reserve component matters. It further stipulated that this board would act independently to monitor, review, and evaluate proposals, actions, and situations impacting Guard and Reserve forces.

While there are more than 60 official boards within DOD, only three are recognized as senior boards: the Defense Science Board, the Defense Policy Board, and the RFPB. The others are civilian boards created by the Federal Advisory Committee Act. The Reserve Forces Policy Board is the only DOD board that was created by Title 10 and is also the only board that acts independently, both in the evaluation of proposals and development of policy recommendations and in the preparation of its annual report to the Congress and the President. The board's charter as it was originally envisioned has enabled it to keep pace with the evolving role of the Reserve components over the years.

### The Secretary of Defense has charged this board to:

**Support transformation.** The board supports Reserve component efforts to keep pace with transformation in strategies, force structure, and capabilities. The board works to fulfill its role as policy advisor through an annual schedule of outreach to combatant commands, this year focusing on a variety of inputs associated with mobilization challenges. Another way the board is fulfilling this role is to look at creative ways in which the Reserve components might both be organized and utilized for post-conflict operations. Recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have highlighted the difficulties associated with stability and reconstruction. We are exploring new ways to make available through the Reserve components the expertise and personnel required to accomplish this aspect of the mission.

**Reconnect with America.** The board has initiated a series of Citizen-Patriot Forums to serve as an information-gathering tool to gain insight from American stakeholders on Guard and Reserve Issues that impact them. Forums are conducted in conjunction with board visits to major command locations and field units and usually involve 20–40 community, public, and private sector leaders. The forums have raised and validated several common issues this year. These include concerns with the duration of the mobilization, on behalf of local responders regarding their inclusion in the Federal planning process for civic emergencies, and a need for more information concerning available outlets for the spirit of volunteerism. A recurring theme also focused on the number of state militias that could be utilized to support the war on terror.

**Strengthen the board's outreach.** The board has an active website and has recently launched an electronic issues update. This e-mail from the Chairman is sent out periodically to board members and is also available on the website.

JFQ



Unloading Air Force C-130 at Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base.



U.S. Navy (Bill Stewart)

To activate Reserve component members quickly and get them in theater will require innovative funding,

**care must be exercised to ensure that irreversible employment or financial decisions are not made prior to issuance of orders**

training, and alert processes. The collective training time at home or at the mobilization station must be reduced. Funding to improve sustained training and equipment readiness must be sufficient to reduce the time from activation to arrival in theater. Shrinking the deficit between mobilized mission

readiness levels and peacetime standards, manning, and resourcing levels will enhance the responsiveness of these units while decreasing the overall activation period required to validate standards and perform the operational mission.

For all but the most urgent operational requirements, the goal must be to provide Reservists at least a 30-day notice of activation. Predictability can be maximized by notifying members that they are being considered. Once they are notified, they along with their families and employers should be prepared in every way to meet challenges of the activation period. Another tenet of predictability is transitioning to the alert period by issuing activation orders as soon as operationally feasible.

Care must be exercised when notifying Reservists of pending activation to ensure that irreversible employment or financial decisions are not made prior to the actual issuance of orders. Board-supported recommendations to improve the mobilization process include:

- naming one organization as the source process owner for identifying requirements, generating requests for forces, and sourcing requirements based on capabilities
- developing a standard operating cycle concept to increase predictability
- reviewing and improving the existing joint billet validation process
- ensuring requests for forces are prioritized and filled as they are generated, replacing sequential decisionmaking with a parallel and collaborative process



Navy Reservists  
inspecting runway  
repairs at Al Asad  
airfield, Iraq.

U.S. Navy (Michael D. Heckman)

- streamlining the activation/mobilization process for members and equipment to remove duplicative processes and repetitive training

- increasing full-time support manning to back the mobilization process

- developing policies and guidance

- automating the procedure and developing capability for all process owners to see the status of individual or unit processing

- improving supplemental personnel equipment issue

- capturing readiness information on the resources within all units that are available to meet the tailored requirements of commanders to improve visibility to key mobilization officials within DOD, the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and the services

- investing resources early to enhance individual and unit readiness, with emphasis on premobilization medical and dental screening, member processing, security clearance, training for mobilization, and equipment processing

- improving medical tracking of individuals in a nondeployable status to ensure deployability.

The board applauds the fact that all services, OSD, the Joint Staff, component commanders, and Reserve components have been diligently working to improve the mobilization process, rebalance the forces, and develop sustainability and predictability. Support and cooperation from DOD, Congress, and collaboration among the services, Joint Staff, Reserve components, combatant commanders, and defense agencies make the mobilization process more relevant, efficient, and effective. The board has supported and participated with agencies within and outside of DOD in developing the best policy, as well as proposed legislative change recommendations, to reform mobilization.

## Specific Needs

*Premobilization training.* Each service has occupational specialist training identified by various names. The Reserve consists of both prior- and non-prior service personnel. Each service component is challenged in training them quickly to meet both deployability and unit readiness standards. While a unit may have willing members filling required positions, they may not be deployable because they are not qualified in their occupational specialties. Nonprior members recruited under a split enlistment option to accommodate civilian education schedules may have attended basic training but may still be awaiting a school seat for occupational specialty training. Prior servicemembers may have been recruited to a unit due to domicile proximity but may not have retrained in the appropriate occupational skill. When a unit is activated, cross leveling



may be needed to fill the vacancies. The board supports a change in DOD regulations and statutes to provide the capability for prior- and nonprior servicemembers to retrain within 12 months from initial entry-level training, or on commissioning.

*Flexibility to support voluntarism.* Involuntary activations to support contingencies should be reduced, meaning there must be greater reliance on volunteers. Current policy, law, and regulations are unsupportive of members performing extended active duty in a volunteer status. Reservists count against active duty end strength and controlled grade limitations if they serve beyond 179 consecutive days on voluntary active duty orders or 270 consecutive days in support of a combatant command. This impact is mitigated through delegation of end strength waivers to the military departments at the close of the fiscal year. However, all services employ volunteer force management procedures based on the potential impact on end strength and controlled grades. Removing these restrictions will reduce the uncertainty of the waiver process and facilitate the use of volunteers in support of increased operational commitments. The board supports a change in policy and, if appropriate, for the long-term legislative change to Title 10 to allow the services greater flexibility in employing Reservists in a voluntary status in support of contingencies.

*Joint automated tracking system.* The current process of mobilizing Reserve members is fragmented with stovepiped and incomplete tracking systems that are not standardized or interoperable across the joint community and do not offer leaders and process users visibility of critical information to make timely and accurate decisions. The services, combatant commanders, and joint planners have indicated the need for a common system of tracking Reserve personnel in the mobilization process from individual notification through demobilization. The long-term focus should be on developing a common mobilization system, integrated and compatible with current and

planned DOD and service readiness, personnel management, and operational planning systems. The services have systems in place or under development to improve personnel tracking; however, they are not integrated, nor do they contain consistent data elements. The board believes an initial approach would be to integrate existing service-specific system data, share it across DOD, and fund accelerated system development.

*Medical and dental readiness.* Individual medical and dental readiness prior to activation has a tremendous impact on members, unit readiness, and mobilization. Some Reservists arrive at the processing station without proper medical or dental screening. They may have problems that delay deployment. Additionally, the Reserve components have difficulty complying with annual medical/dental readiness requirements because the Defense Health Program only funds care for Re-

### **continuity of care has been the leading issue of the Reserve component chiefs the last three years**

servists on active duty for more than 30 days. Compounding this problem, treatment facilities for statutory and regulatory screenings may not have sufficient resources to provide the necessary screening and care. The following approaches could address this deficiency: implement DOD individual medical readiness standards; improve the categorization and tracking of individual medical readiness of all Reservists; revise Title 10, section 1074, to include funded medical and dental examinations and treatment to meet readiness standards regardless of duty status; and resource medical and dental readiness on a level that allows Reservists to maintain the statutory and regulatory requirements.

The board recognizes that keeping personnel medically and dentally ready is costly; however, continued reliance on the Reserve components means alternatives must be explored. One advance has been the policy for standardization of individual medical readiness reporting issued by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health

Affairs, which the services are implementing. Another is legislation to allow medical and dental screening and care when Reservists are notified of a call to active duty exceeding 30 days. DOD policy broadens this provision by stating that a member of the Ready Reserve may at any time while in a military duty status be provided any medical and dental screening or care necessary to meet applicable standards for deployment, as provided by the policies and procedures of the service and Reserve component concerned. These policies will require continuing evaluation to determine whether they should be modified.

*Family support.* Much has been done since the Persian Gulf War to improve all areas of family support, particularly health care; yet there is still a significant lack of understanding, access to, eligibility for, and rules governing TRICARE benefits and of the importance of maintaining current Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System information. These programs are complex and often are not designed with Reservists in mind.

Ensuring continuity and equity of health care will take work, especially since half of the families of members do not live within reasonable proximity to military treatment facilities. The goal should be affordable family health care on the right level regardless of demographics and existing medical coverage. Continuity of care has been the leading issue of the Reserve component chiefs the last three years.

In addition, family members must understand their benefits and how to access them. Family support programs change frequently, and it is hard to keep members informed due to their geographic dispersion. There are some great initiatives within the services to improve family support; however, much can be done to enhance standardization and accountability across the services. Programs are being designed from a joint service, Total Force perspective, and the services and Reserve components are making every effort to ensure that any member or family, whether active, Guard, or Reserve,

Marine Reserve  
helicopter squadron  
returning from  
Afghanistan.



Marine Forces Reserves (Lydia L. Collison)

can use the programs available at any installation. Additionally, the National Guard has established over 400 family assistance centers in the states and territories to provide local support and coordination for services. All services and Reserve components are also participating in Military One Sources, an employee assistance program accessible through a toll-free telephone number and the Internet. The board supports ongoing efforts to improve

### **the board is interested in assisting with the development of policy as it relates to civilianization and privatization**

TRICARE and family support programs. Timely education and assistance will be particularly important as we use volunteers more frequently and for shorter periods.

*Employer support.* Growing Reserve use has also increased strain on employers. The board is concerned that continuous mobilizations will have a negative impact on Reserve manning. Measures must be put in place to ensure that employer support does not become too great a burden, particularly for small businesses and self-employed Reservists. Much is being done by OSD, employer support of the Guard and Reserve, and

Congress, but a need remains to develop policy as a basis for how to best share the talents of individual Reservists, enhance employer support and voluntarism, and strengthen member rights and family support.

*Force management and rebalancing.* Managing force requirements for prolonged contingency operations requires that use of the Reserve components be managed in a way that sustains their capabilities over the long run. To prevent over-stressing, a process must be developed that tracks augmentees and individuals within units who have been previously activated to support the global war on terrorism. Solutions such as shifting recruiting and retention to target stressed capabilities, and innovative training technology to reclassify Reservists not previously activated, should be considered to meet the skill sets for predictable needs. The services must look now for approaches to sustain the Reserve forces for future requirements, such as developing a "just in time" rather than a "just in case" force structure and offering financial and other incentives to attract and retain personnel for stressed units. Examples of force structure development include constructing modular units that can be tailored to support required capabilities and blending active

and Reserve components to support a common mission and take advantage of Reserve strengths and experience.

### **A New Compact**

The present paradigm of the 39-day Reservist must change to allow greater flexibility and a transformation construct such as continuum of service to be instituted. The answer must also include a new compact with members, their employers, and their families which provides realistic incentives for participation beyond one drill week-end per month and two weeks during the summer. Reliance on the Reserve components will continue into the foreseeable future; thus it is crucial that our governing laws and regulations support this environment. The active component suffers under the current system due to inability to fill requirements efficiently and effectively, and the individual Reservist suffers because the laws and regulations negatively impact individual compensation, benefits, entitlements, and career progression.

The board applauds the methods the Reserve components have developed to support the active component mission with volunteers. However, it will take DOD support and congressional action to develop the statutes and regulations to fully support this transformation once policy is set. DOD and the services are moving rapidly to identify and execute force structure changes, participate in mobilization reform, and develop policy and legislative changes to support innovative management practices. For example, with transformation there is some discussion of civilianizing the Military Judge Advocate General's Corps, a move that could raise policy issues. The board is interested in assisting with the development of policy as it relates to civilianization and privatization that impacts the Reserve components.

The services have implemented measures to improve the force mix and early reliance on involuntary mobilizations. For example, between fiscal years 2005 and 2009 the Army will rebalance over 100,000 spaces to improve force readiness and ease the

Air Force Reservists  
returning from Iraq.



2<sup>d</sup> Communications Squadron (Michael A. Kaplan)

stress on the Guard and Reserve. The Air Force is organized and funded to integrate the Reserve components into every aspect of its mission. Its air and space expeditionary force construct allows for maximum use of volunteers, thus minimizing the need for involuntary mobilization within the first 15 days of a rapidly developing contingency. The Naval Reserve contains a significant portion of Navy airlift and maritime patrol capability, and these resources are integrated to the point of seamless operations. The Coast Guard began commissioning the first of 13 maritime safety and security teams for domestic security operations in FY02, reducing the need for Reserve-staffed port security units to respond to local contingencies. Port security units are designed to support combatant commanders overseas in strategic ports of debarkation. Every service has made structural changes in the active and Reserve components that reduce

stresses on critical skills and enhance capabilities. Many began before September 11, 2001, though the need to continue is recognized. Some changes in Reserve management policies are being implemented to improve voluntarism. The board concurs with the current direction and measures to rebalance the force and develop innovative management practices.

### Fairness and Equity

RFPB continues to hear themes of differing equity and compensation between the active and Reserve components. These comments are voiced most often as RFPB visits the combatant commanders and deployed Reserve component forces supporting the global war on terrorism. Equity in pay and benefits remains a concern for many Reservists and for the board.

Identifying inequities and proposing policy solutions through DOD will remain a priority for RFPB. Recommended changes must take into account the statutory and budget implications.

Regardless of which component a servicemember belongs to—active, Guard, or Reserve—the pay and benefits for the same duty in the same locale should be the same. To RFPB that means the entire compensation package, basic pay plus incentives, bonuses, special pays, and such benefits as basic allowance for housing (BAH), medical and dental care, per diem, and family support. Recognizing the importance of these issues to the future Total Force, Congress and DOD have focused on correction. The most notable of their efforts are improved health care benefits, full commissary privileges, hostile fire and imminent danger pay, and new tax breaks.





Army Reserve civil affairs soldiers in Iraq.

982° Combat Camera (Daniel D. Meacham)

A recurring inconsistency is how the services interpret and pay travel claims. Reservists wonder why their per diem or travel allowance differs from members in another component, especially at the same location with the same duty. The increasing use of Reservists, particularly in a deployed status, has raised the intensity and visibility of this issue. All the active and Reserve components are compensated using the joint travel regulations (JTR) to compute eligibility and amounts. On the surface this appears to be an administrative matter that could be easily fixed. However, digging deeper into specifics, the board sees it not as a systemic problem with JTR, but rather a matter of the services applying different interpretations to these regulations. Thus it becomes a morale issue. The board unanimously supports any effort to simplify and clarify travel and per diem entitlements to provide uniformity of interpretation and payment.

Many Reservists earn more in their civilian jobs than on active duty. An attempt to remedy this issue with a mobilization insurance system was disastrous and was quickly terminated by DOD. The level of Reserve involvement at home and abroad makes the insurance solution financially unsupportable within an already-stressed DOD budget. While there is no easy solution, RFPB continues to support all efforts to review the many proposals aimed at providing relief. This is a recruiting and retention issue that will not go away.

Another problem is inequitable treatment in matters such as billeting, personal protective equipment, and organizational clothing. Perceived as second class treatment, such unevenness shows a level of insensitivity that

must be changed to ensure that Reservists serve equally with their active duty peers.

RFPB is concerned that a proposed merger of the Reserve personnel appropriation with the active duty account could shift Reserve training dollars into the active duty pay account; thus the board believes both equity and policy concerns should be addressed before this takes place.

Under current law, BAH inequities exist for Reservists serving on active duty less than 140 days and those without dependents, who must maintain a primary residence while serving temporary periods of active duty. While this disparate payment saves substantial sums for DOD, these members receive significantly less daily housing entitlement than their active duty counterparts. There is an exception for members serving in support of

contingency operations, but separate BAH rates still apply for noncontingency duty.

The board is concerned further that while improvements have been made to the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 through the Servicemembers' Civil Relief Act of 2003, there is no remedy for inequities that arise when student Reservists are involuntarily called to support the global war on terrorism. Protections must be extended to student Guard and Reserve members who lose tuition and placement at colleges and universities.

### Jointness

Full integration of the Reserve components in joint operations is no longer an ideal; it is reality. Given the strategic situation, national security policy, and future commitments, their use tomorrow will most likely resemble their use today except they will be more jointly oriented and tasked. Training, equipping, maintaining, and educating members to the level of their active duty counterparts continues. Joint officer management and joint professional military education are inextricably linked. Understanding

### Reservists are increasingly serving on joint staffs and in joint billets

service cultures, practices, and procedures is fundamental to operating in the joint environment whether in a headquarters or unit. Servicemembers coordinating joint operations must know joint procedures, capabilities, and doctrine. Reservists are increasingly serving on joint staffs and in joint billets. This trend will continue with Reserve integration into the Total Force. Therefore, it is intuitive that Reservists must receive both joint professional military education and joint duty experience to meet the Goldwater-Nichols requirement on joint force integration. Without the education or the opportunity to serve in joint billets, the Reservist will never become fully qualified as a joint servicemember; and with the continued use of the Reserve component, DOD will not be best utilizing its leading augmentation resource, the Reserve member.

A report by the General Accounting Office to the Subcommittee on Military Personnel and House of Representatives stated that the absence of a strategic plan for joint officer development is a barrier to joint professional military education integration and implementation. Further studies by independent contractors concluded that operational and organization changes are needed to implement the mandated joint professional military education program. The board believes DOD Instruction 1215.20 can be a catalyst to address the systemic problems that preclude full integration of the Reserve component-joint officer management program and that the program should be supported to head off the need for a waiver for a candidate to be appointed as a Reserve component chief.

### Stability Operations

Recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have allowed RFPB to contribute to policy recommendations related to stabilization and reconstruction operations. This represents an area where creativity might provide solutions for the future. One idea that arose from a 2003 symposium was a universal command, a Reserve component organization of military and civilian volunteers. Other proposals include separate stability and reconstruction divisions, one active and one Reserve, and future brigades and units of action. The board held a stability and reconstruction conference in January and agreed on the need for a quick response force that reflects modularity and flexibility.

Stabilization and reconstruction operations are sometimes referred to as the postconflict phase although, as seen in Iraq, the line between the conflict and stabilization phases is gray. Reserve component units such as civil affairs, psychological operations, military police, and engineers already play a key role. RFPB plans in 2004 to focus on organizational structure implications, developing policy, and the impact of stabilization and reconstruction on Reserve component units and members, to include use of civilian

volunteers. Given today's emphasis on force rebalancing and transformation, the board has a role in reviewing current proposals for reform in the context of DOD policy and its recommendation. It will coordinate with DOD and other Federal agencies including the National Defense University, Office of Force Transformation, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and the Army War College Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute as well as leading scholars and think tanks.

Warfighting and stabilization demand new approaches for Reserve component use. RFPB is assisting other organizations and doing independent research concerning expanded use of auxiliaries and recalled retirees, utilizing existing authority for creating a Temporary Reserve, expanding use of State Defense Forces, and examining other mechanisms to meet military needs and contribute to a new paradigm of Reserve service. The objective will be to develop policy for using some or all of these mechanisms.

Guard and Reserve personnel serve in the most technologically advanced force in the world and are continually asked to do more. To continue using Reservists at this pace, we must develop the best possible compensation and incentive package and sensitize our leadership to ensure fair and equitable treatment. Though Reserve members are true patriots and fully understand their responsibilities, the stress on families and employers along with fairness and equity issues could harm retention. In these turbulent and watershed times, it is essential that the Reserve Forces Policy Board continue to be a viable, independent source of policy advice to the Secretary of Defense and at the same time meet its role of keeping the President and Congress informed with its annual report and working on behalf of the extraordinary Guard and Reserve men and women who serve the Nation. **JFQ**